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J. Byron McCormick Lecture
PROFESSIONALISMS

Richard A. Posner*

Some years ago, in a lecture at another law school, I traced the decline of
the law as a profession, in a rather special sense of "profession" that I associated
with the medieval guild.1 In another sense, however, the law has become more
professional in the very same period on which the earlier lecture focused. But in
another and more profound sense the law is lagging alarmingly behind a wave of
genuine professionalism that is one of the big underreported stories of our time.
My effort in this lecture will be to untangle these distinct senses of
"professionalism" and consider the implications for the future of American law.
1. PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL MYSTIQUE
The terms "profession" and "professionalism" have an incredibly large
and vaguely bounded range of meanings, the despair of sociology, the discipline
that has done most to study the professions. 2 I shall begin by using the terms in
reference to the set of occupations that are most commonly referred to as
professions. They are law, medicine (and related fields such as dentistry,
pharmacology, optometry, nursing, physical therapy, and psychology), military
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Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior
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1.
Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1
(1993), reprinted with considerable revision as Chapter 1 of my book Overcoming Law
(1995).

2.
See, e.g., ANDREW ABBOTT, Tm SYSTEM OF PROFEssIONs: AN ESSAY ON THE
DivIsION OF EXPERT LABOR (1988); ELIOT FRliDsON, PROFESSIONALISM REBORN: THEORY,
PROPHECY, AND POLICY (1994).
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officership, engineering, the clergy, teaching, architecture, actuarial services,
librarianship, social work, journalism, and accounting. Occupations that are not
commonly referred to as professions include business management and business
generally, advertising, public relations, farming, politics, fiction writing,
investment advice, the civil service, soldiering below the commissioned-officer
level, entertainment, construction (other than architecture and engineering), police
and detective work, computer programming, and most jobs in transportation.
The hallmark of a profession is the belief that it is an occupation of
considerable public importance, the practice of which requires highly specialized,
even esoteric, knowledge that can be acquired only by specialized formal
education or a carefully supervised apprenticeship, hence an occupation that
cannot responsibly be entered at will but only in compliance with a specified, and
usually, exacting protocol and upon proof of competence. Because of the
importance of the occupation, and therefore the professional's capacity to harm
society, it is often believed that entry into it should be controlled by government:
that not only should the title of "physician," "lawyer," etcetera be reserved for
people who satisfy the profession's own criteria for entry to the profession, but no
one should be allowed to perform the services performed by the members of the
profession without a license from the government. For the same reasons (i.e., the
profession's importance and its capacity to do harm), but also because the arcane
skills of the professional make his performance difficult.for outsiders to monitor
and therefore facilitate exploitation, it is usually believed that the norms and
working conditions of a profession should be such as to discourage the undiluted
pursuit of pecuniary self-interest.
This description, culled from the sociological literature and common
observation, fits law and medicine-the most powerful and most studied of
contemporary American professions-more closely than it does the other
professions. But they all fit some part, or parts, of it better than the nonprofessions
do, though the line blurs when we consider such occupations as psychology, social
work, and forest management. The rough edges don't matter to my purposes here;
it is enough that a family resemblance among the various professions can be
discerned despite their heterogeneity.
The key to classifying an occupation as a profession, it must be
emphasized, is not the actual possession of specialized, socially valuable
knowledge; it is the belief that some group has such knowledge, for it is the belief
that enables the group to claim professional status, with the opportunities for
exclusion and other privileges, and the resulting personal advancement, that such
status confers. The belief need not be true, need not even be positively correlated
with the amount of specialized, socially valuable knowledge that the group
actually possesses. We are probably more conscious today of the limitations of
medical knowledge than people were in the Middle Ages in Italy, where medicine
was a highly prestigious profession even though physicians had almost no
therapeutic resources.
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I shall call the case in which belief in a profession's knowledge claims is
not justified by the profession's actual knowledge the case of "professional
mystique." The greater that mystique, the more secure the profession's claim is to
the privileges of professional status. A profession whose knowledge claims are
inherently shaky has a particularly urgent interest in preserving its mystique, and
let us consider the techniques by which it can do this:
One is to cultivate an obscurantiststyle of discourse, in order to make the
profession's processes of inquiry and inference impenetrable to outsiders.
Another technique, but, as we are about to see,
to fix demanding educational qualifications for entry
raising the educational level of the profession, such
profession's claim to possess specialized knowledge
education is a well-accepted route to knowledge. It also
thought processes more opaque to outsiders.

really two techniques, is
into the profession. By
qualifications make the
more plausible because
makes the professional's

Two types of educational qualification should be distinguished. The first
is insistence on general education or educability, an insistence designed to limit
professional entry to a stratum of highly intelligent persons. The second is the
specialized professional training itself, which is designed not merely to impart
essential knowledge but also to establish the uniqueness of that knowledge in
relation to the knowledge possessed by outsiders. This distinction shows that the
fixing of educational qualifications has two distinct functions in preserving
professional mystique: to screen for intellectuality, and to preserve the
impermeability of professional knowledge, or in other words, the profession's
autonomy. Although these functions can be held separate analytically, they
interact. Screening for intelligence is bound to increase impermeability because
highly intelligent people are comfortable with complexity and special
vocabularies. People of average intelligence could not create anything as
intellectually complex and challenging as the Internal Revenue Code or the
doctrines of property law.
A fourth technique of professional mystification is the cultivation of
charismaticpersonality-the selection for membership in the profession of people
whose appearance, personality, or personal background creates an impression of
deep, perhaps inarticulable, insight and of masterful, unique competence.
Fifth, the profession bent on maximizing its mystique will resist
subspecialization-the breaking up of its constituent tasks into subtasks-because
that would tend to demystify the profession's methods, to make them transparent.
The professional's mysterious mastery might be seen to consist in an assemblage
of routine procedures requiring no specialized education to perform adequately, in
just the same way that the intricate craft of carriage making devolved into the
assembly-line production of a far more complex vehicle, the automobile, by lessskilled workers. A profession concerned with maintaining its mystique will
therefore display underspecialization.
Sixth is lack of hierarchy.When a complex task is broken down into its
components, each performed by a different class of worker, a need for supervision
HeinOnline -- 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 3 1998
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and coordination arises, producing the hierachical structure, with its tiers of
management, that is characteristic of organizations. Traditionally, professionals
were not organized hierarchically. Lawyers practiced by themselves or in
partnership with other lawyers; likewise doctors.
Seventh, a profession is likely to employ altruisticpretense; that is, it will
try to conceal the extent to which its members are motivated by financial
-incentives, in order to make more plausible the implication that they have been
drawn to the profession by the opportunity to pursue a calling that yields rich
intellectual rewards. Altruistic pretense reinforces charismatic personality, which
is undermined by the appearance of self-seeking.
Eighth, the profession will be anticompetitive. It will seek both to repel
competition from outside the profession and to limit competition within the
profession. It will do these things to protect the pecuniary self-interest of its
members directly, but also to bolster professional mystique. Thus it will try
particularly hard to outlaw competing services whose success might undermine its
knowledge claims. If accountants were seen to give just as good tax advice as tax
lawyers, the claim of tax lawyers to possess a valuable body of skills that no other
group possesses would lose credibility; likewise if pharmacists were permitted to
prescribe drugs and not merely dispense them. And competition, especially within
the profession, requires hustling and self-promotion that undermine the
professional's effort to present himself as a charismatic master, as someone in
control, since in a competitive market it is the customer rather than the supplier
who is in control. Altruistic pretense plays a supporting role here by concealing
the self-interested character of efforts to limit competition for one's services.
Ninth, the profession will resist the systematization of professional
knowledge; it will be anti-algorithmic.As long as "the means of production of a
profession's knowledge-based service is contained in their heads," the profession's
monopoly is secure. 3 Once the knowledge that is the professional's capital is
organized in a form in which people can employ it without having to undergo the
rigors of professional training, the professional becomes dispensable. Thus one
can imagine computerized diagnostic techniques and artificial intelligence
eventually eroding the positions of the physician and of the lawyer, respectively.
The fact that a profession cultivates professional mystique does not prove
that it lacks real knowledge; modem medicine is a case in point. The addition of
mystique to knowledge enhances the profession's awards and so is valuable even
if the profession does possess genuine, and genuinely esoteric, useful knowledge.
Still, the denser the web of mystique-enhancing techniques that the profession
spins, the shakier the profession's knowledge claims are likely to be, because the
techniques are more valuable, and therefore more likely to be used heavily, the
more there is to conceal. Conversely, they are less likely to be employed the more
defensible an occupation's knowledge claims are. This is true whether or not it is a

3.

KnrrH M. McDONALD, TBE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS 185 (1995).
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profession in the usual sense. The occupation could have achieved professional
status not because of flim-flam but because it really does possess highly
specialized, socially valuable knowledge that cannot be accessed by the ordinary
person or embodied in algorithms or rote knowledge.
There are other symptoms of the shakiness of a profession's knowledge
claims besides its employment of some or all of the techniques of mystification.
One is simply defeat when faced by a new challenge, and is conspicuous in the
case of the military profession, which is uniquely exposed to challenge in an
environment that it does not control. Sorcery and prophecy enjoy professional
status in many primitive societies, and are overthrown when the practitioners face
competition from groups that use rational methods.
Another symptom that a profession's knowledge claims are weak is that it
employs methods of selection into or promotion within the profession that (like
selection in favor of charismatic personality) do not further the acquisition of
knowledge-methods such as nepotism, credentialism, discrimination, and
automatic promotion. Anyone familiar with legal education, especially before the
1960s, will recognize this symptom, which I'll call nonrational employment
practices. Anyone familiar with the legal profession in general, especially before
the 1960s, will recognize not only this symptom but also every one of the nine
techniques that I described by which a profession disguises its epistemological
weakness.
II. THE GROWING PROFESSIONALISM OF LAW...
I want to assume rather than belabor these points, and move on now to
developments during and since the 1960s that have seemed to make, and to an
extent have made, the law more professional in the good sense, the sense in which
a profession earns its status and attendant privileges by deploying a body of
genuine, specialized, socially valuable knowledge-based skills rather than by
cultivating a professional mystique.
The obscurantist style-legal jargon-is as bad as ever in law, and the
insistence on a very heavy dose of formal education, both undergraduate and
professional, is unabated. But the professional education itself is far more
permeable to the claims of other disciplines, especially but not only economics,
than it once was. There is much less confident assertion of the profession's
autonomy, especially in the academic branch of the profession, where the new,
outside perspectives on law have been most influential. Interdisciplinarity makes a
field more accessible to the practitioners of other disciplines; so today we see
economists, political theorists, psychologists, and even literary critics writing
about law with sufficient authority to require the academic lawyers to take notice
and respond.
There is also, I sense without being able to prove, less cultivation of
charismatic personality as an important constituent of professional success. The
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"lawyer statesman" model of professional practice is in much-lamented decline,4
in part because of the decline of supporting structures such as underspecialization
and altruistic pretense and monopoly and in part, as we shall see later, because of
the growing professionalism of competing occupations.
Specialization in the provision of legal services has grown. We can see
this in the emergence of the paralegal as a distinct tier of professional provider, in
the increasingly standardized division of labor between judge and law clerk, in the
growing division between academic law and practicing law and between academic
law and judging (so that today almost all legal scholarship is the product of the
academy, and judges and lawyers complain about the "irrelevance" to their
concerns of most such scholarshipS), and above all in the increased specialization
of legal practice, with fewer lawyers holding themselves out as competent in more
than one field. Increased specialization in the legal profession has contributed to
the decline of the charismatic legal-professional personality; increasingly, clients
demand a narrow specialist's competence rather than the wisdom of the statesmangeneralist. Further contributing to that decline has been the dismantling of many of
the impediments to competition in the legal-services industry, a dismantling that
has revealed that most lawyers are motivated by the same incentives as the
members of nonprofessional occupations. The increase in competition has forced
lawyers to serve their clients better and so to rely more on specialized knowledge
that has genuine value to the client and less on mystique.
Specialization has been accompanied by a growth in professional
hierarchies. Take judging. It used to be that judicial work was performed by
judges. In the federal judiciary, there were originally just two tiers of judgesdistrict judges and Supreme Court Justices. 6 Today, judicial work in the federal
courts is divided among tiers. The lowest comprises interns and externs; then come
staff attorneys and law clerks; above them magistrate judges; then district judges;
then circuit judges; and finally Supreme Court Justices. Similar tiering is
increasingly found in state courts as well. And in most large law firms there are
now paralegals, associates, income partners, and equity partners, rather than just
partners as originally or, later, just partners and associates.

4.

See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE

CRISIS INTiE LEGAL PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); ANTHONY
T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF TBm LEGAL PROFESSION (1993). For
criticism, see RICHARD A. POSNER, OvERCOMING LAW 93-94 (1995); Richard A. Posner,
Barflies, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 31, 1994, at 40. For a different take on this lamentational

literature, see Kenneth Anderson, A New Class ofLawyers: The Therapeuticas Rights Talk,
96 COLuM. L. REV. 1062 (1996).
5.
See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Educationand the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34 (1992).
6.
Technically three, because there are actually two tiers of Supreme Court
Justices: the Chief Justice of the United States and the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court.
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The impetus to the developments in the legal profession that I have been
describing, as to parallel developments that I shall discuss shortly in the military
sphere, came in part from that tell-tale symptom of a profession's dependence on
mystique-defeat. Beginning in the 1960s, the legal profession in all its branches
became associated with policies that in time came to be to a considerable extent
discredited. These policies included the judicial activism of the Supreme Court in
the heyday of Earl Warren's chief justiceship: a related knee-jerk receptivity to
every "liberal" proposal for enlarging legal rights (and incidentally lawyers'
incomes); the plain incapacity of legal reasoning, as demonstrated by modem
economics, to make sense of the legal regulation of competition and monopoly; a
relaxation of the barriers to litigation that has contributed to an enormous,
unsettling, and unforeseen increase in the amount of litigation; and a host of
lawyer-fostered statutory "reforms," in fields ranging from bankruptcy and
consumer protection to employment discrimination, safety regulation, and
environmental protection, that have often had perverse, unintended consequences.
The traumatic impact of these failures on the legal profession's self-confidence has
not been nearly so great as the traumatic impact of the Vietnam War on the
American military profession. But it has had some impact, which, along with an
economy-wide trend toward deregulation and the destabilizing effect of enormous
growth in the demand for legal services and the resulting rapid expansion in the
profession, has spurred the profession to become more professional in the good
sense.
One byproduct of increased legal professionalism has been the decline in
what I earlier termed nonrational employment practices. There is much less
discrimination and nepotism in hiring and promotion, not only in law firms but
also in the federal judiciary and-though to a lesser extent because of the virus of
reverse discrimination, which rages more strongly in the legal academy than in the
other branches of the profession-in the law schools. Automatic promotion has
waned both in law firms and in the academy, and the imposition of publication
requirements has enabled the academy to establish rational, if sometimes
inflexible, criteria for promotion.

II. ... AND OF EVERYTHING ELSE AS WELL
The law's increased professionalism is not an isolated phenomenon;
indeed, it is not limited to the professions. Within the professions, there is an
interesting parallel to law in the evolution of the American military profession
since the early 1970s. The Vietnam War revealed striking deficiencies in the
civilian management of national security affairs. But it also revealed the
considerable amateurism of the military profession. 7 The officer corps relied
heavily on mystique in lieu of serious study of and planning for the exigencies of

7.
See, for an excellent popular account, JAMEs KrrFIELD, PRODIGAL SOLDIERS:
How THE GENERATION OF OFFICERS BORN OF VIETNAM REvOLUTIONIZED THE AMERICAN
STYLE OF WAR (1995).
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modem warfare. Nepotism was rife both in routine promotions and in
appointments to important commands; charisma frequently substituted for
competence; bluff, wishful thinking, and outright misrepresentation were used to
conceal failures. A hypertrophy of mystique professionalism developed in the
form of lethal interservice rivalries that could be controlled only by the equivalent
of noncompete agreements; it was as unthinkable to the navy that the army could
direct naval aviation missions as it was unthinkable to lawyers that accountants
could conduct tax litigation. The armed services were united only in believing the
military a world apart that could neither learn from the civilian sector, for example
about the intelligent management of race relations and other personnel problems,
nor even communicate articulately with it. A caricature of the warrior as
Neanderthal, Curtis LeMay, became emblematic of the U.S. military of the period.
Thirty years later, as shown by the performance of the American military
in the Persian Gulf Campaign, the military profession had been transformed, partly
in reaction to the disastrous effects of the Vietnam War on the morale,
effectiveness, and public esteem of the military, and partly because the end of the
draft forced the military to design "professional" armed forces. By the end of the
period of reform, the system of promotion had been revamped to place emphasis
on successful performance in realistic, objectively evaluated military exercises;
personnel policies in general had been professionalized. Feedback loops ("after
action review") had been created to foster learning from experience. Emphasis on
continuing education, both military and civilian, had facilitated the creation of a
more intelligent officer corps and one able to make maximum use of modem
analytical tools and modem technologies in the waging of war, and also to
communicate effectively with civilians, as shown by the military's media relations
during the Gulf Campaign. Procedures and institutions to assure at least a
minimum of interservice cooperation had been created. War remains emotional
and unpredictable to a degree not matched by any other professional activity; but
American military officership has become legitimately professional to a far greater
degree than it once was, and perhaps to a greater degree than law is.
What is more interesting even than the increasing professionalization of
the professions is the increasing professionalization of all work. If "good
professionalism"--the kind that contributes to human welfare and not just to the
self-interest of the members of the profession-is the application of a specialized
body of knowledge to an activity of importance to the society, then as knowledge
grows and necessarily becomes more specialized, we can, because of the limited
intellectual scope of even the ablest human being, expect more and more
occupations to become professionalized. Yet an occupation might never acquire
the traditional accouterments of professionalism-maybe because it would not
need to cultivate a professional mystique.
If the sociological study of the professions owes most to Durkheim, the
study of what might be called universal professionalization must acknowledge a
major debt to Weber. The hallmark of modernization, for Weber, was the bringing
of more and more activities under the governance of rationality; early and
somewhat questionable illustrations were the "rationalization" of industry through
HeinOnline -- 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 8 1998
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mergers and the control of production by means of time-and-motion studies
("Taylorism"). The growth of rational methods would, Weber rightly predicted,
foster the disenchantment of the world, as activities became demystified and
transparent. 8
In the last few years, the process foreseen by Weber has taken giant
strides forward. 9 Consider, for example, university administration. It was, once, a
bastion of amateurism. The typical university president was a distinguished
scholar who had stepped directly from his career of teaching and research into the
presidency. He was assisted by a small administrative staff composed primarily of
amateurs as well, either former teacher-scholars like the president or, at some Ivy
League schools, socially well-connected alumni as well. Today, with universities
often multihundred-million dollar enterprises subject to complex laws and
regulations, the typical university president is a professional administrator, having
climbed lower rungs that normally include service as a university provost and
earlier as a dean. He is assisted by a large staff of specialists in administration,
many of whom do not have substantial academic backgrounds but instead have
backgrounds in law practice, accounting, finance, and business administration; and
the university's hospital complex will be managed by a professional hospital
administrator-hospital administration having become a specialized field in itself.
It is business above all that has become rationalized, professionalized, to
a degree that Weber might have had difficulty imagining. Although there is still an
important role for lone-wolf entrepreneurs in start-up firms and in takeover and
turnaround situations, mature business firms are increasingly the domain of
thoroughly rational and systematic methods in financial management, personnel
("human resources" administration), inventory control, marketing, production,
procurement, government relations, law, and every other dimension of
administering a complex enterprise. As the professions have become increasingly
businesslike, business has become increasingly professional, not in the spurious
sense in which some of the old-line professions cultivated a professional mystique,
but in the real sense of deploying specialized knowledge in rational and effective
pursuit of clearly defined, socially important goals.

8.
CAPITALISM

See, e.g., MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETic AND THE SPIRIT OF

180-83 (Talcott Parsons trans., 1958);

ANTHONY

T. KRONMAN,

MAX WEBER

cb. 8 (1983).

9.

Cf

STEVEN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS: THE CHANGING ROLE OF

PRoFEssIoNALs IN PoLmcs AND PUBLIC LIFE 205-07 (1994). The process is deplored by

Brint, id. ch. 10, and by another left-wing sociologist, Elliott A. Krause, in his book Death
ofthe Guilds: Professions,States, and the Advance of Capitalism, 1930 to the Present ch. 8
(1996). Brint and Krause regard the rationalization of the professions as a deplorable
success of capitalism, bringing all economic activities under the rule of the market. For
criticism of Brint, see Anderson, supra note 4, at 1072-81. The denigration of
professionalism is a sign that the left is increasingly reactionary-it is increasingly
nostalgic for premodem methods of production.
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IV.LAW'S GROWING PROFESSIONALISM RECONSIDERED
The tide of professionalism that is sweeping the country, and indeed the
world, brings into sharp focus the question how much real progress the law has
made in moving from the era of professional mystique to the era of substantive
rationality. It has made some progress, but less than the other activities I have
mentioned and, above all, less than its traditional peer, the medical profession. The
transformation of the medical profession since the 1960s has been astonishing.
The centerpiece of that transformation has been the explosion of medical
knowledge, which has vastly increased the efficacy of medical treatment in
prolonging life and alleviating suffering. As one would expect, this explosion has
been accompanied by a rapid decline in the mystique elements formerly so
conspicuous in this profession-highly discriminatory selection practices, the
concealment of carelessness and incompetence (the "conspiracy of silence" and
the often literal "burying of mistakes"), the physician's assumption of omniscience
in dealing with patients and refusal to level with patients with regard to prognoses,
hostility to forms of health maintenance that do not require esoteric medical skills
(such as diet and exercise), inadequate specialization that had physicians doing
many tasks that nurses could perform as well or better and that had nurses doing
many tasks that medical orderlies and technicians could perform as well or better,
disdain for outsider methods or disciplines such as statistics and public health, and
hostility toward innovations in the pricing and delivery of medical services. The
advent of social insurance in the form of Medicare and Medicaid, and of advanced
technology, sent the costs of medical services soaring, thus exposing the primitive
management techniques of the medical sector. Faced with a defeat potentially of
Vietnam proportions, the medical profession together with the other components
of the vast medical-services sector discovered, and are busy adopting, rational
methods of medical administration that are designed to prevent doctor and patient
from contracting for wasteful treatments paid by hapless third parties-the biggest
source of avoidable medical inflation.
By comparison with the military profession, business and university
administration, and the medical profession, the law's professionalizing has not
proceeded very far at all. Part of the reason may be the law's deep entwinement
with politics, which, in a democracy anyway, resists professionalization, at least of
the sort that might help the law to become more professional. The qualification is
important. Politics, too, has become more professional in recent decades as a result
of improvements in the techniques of public opinion polling, campaign
advertising, and the identification, packaging, and promotion of political
candidates as media stars. But none of this has "rubbed off' on the law in any
useful way; there is no evidence that the televising of trials, appeals, and judicial
confirmation hearings contributes to the quality of a legal system, or that the use of
public opinion polling techniques and the insights of social psychology to select,
and then influence, jurors has had a positive effect. Because of the strategic
character of litigation, technical improvements can increase the cost to both sides
without a commensurate benefit in more accurate determinations; this is a frequent
criticism of the heavy use of expert witnesses in many types of litigation. An
HeinOnline -- 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 10 1998
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exactly parallel argument could, of course, be made against the genuineness of the
professionalizing of military officership if a global perspective were employed,
which, however, few Americans would be inclined to do; and certain medical
improvements, too, have limited or even negative benefits because of secondary
effects-for example, an improvement that saves the patient's life only for him to
succumb to a more expensive illness a short time later, or that by making a disease
less lethal induces people to take less care to avoid it (the case of syphilis, and
perhaps of AIDS). But the problem of running-in-place improvements seems
particularly acute in the case of law, as also of sports.
Let me give an example of the sort of change in law that at first glance
seems to be an increase in professionalism, yet on more careful scrutiny is seen to
be an example of running in place or even falling back. If you compare judicial
opinions of the Supreme Court today with its opinions of thirty or forty years ago,
you will notice signs of increased professionalism. The opinions are more
thorough, more accurate, and more methodical; they reflect a greater depth of
research both legal and collateral; they appear to be more carefully written in an
effort to avoid misunderstandings and irresponsible or otherwise troublesome
dicta; they are more uniform, less idiosyncratic, in style-more "correct," in a
grammarian's sense. They are more, one might say, the product of rational
methods and rules, less of individual vision. This is not an accident. There have
been significant changes in the staffing of the Court. Appointments to the Court
itself are scrutinized more carefully, a process that tends to eliminate oddballs and
other highly individual candidates. Prior judicial experience has become a de facto
qualification; all of the Associate Justices have some. The number of Supreme
Court law clerks has more than doubled. The clerks are more carefully selected,
moreover, with merit playing an even more predominant role than in the earlier
period of which I've spoken, and almost every clerk who is hired has already spent
a year as a law clerk to another judge, most often a federal appellate judge, whose
docket will be similar to that of the Supreme Court. The management innovation
known as the "cert. pool" has enabled the law clerks to screen applications for
review in less time than in the earlier period despite the fact that the number of
applications has increased even faster than the number of clerks. As a result, the
law clerks have more time to work on opinions, so that the effective and not
merely nominal ratio of law clerks' to Justices' opinions has increased
substantially. This, together with the more careful selection of the clerks and the
requirement that they have prior clerkship experience, has enabled the
improvements in the Supreme Court's opinions of which I have spoken.
But the improvements-what are they really worth? The opinions take
longer to read, they are duller, and they are harder to use as predictors of the
Court's reaction to future cases because of their impersonal cast. Much of what
goes on in them and accounts for their length and their dense texture, such as the
ping-pong game between majority and dissenting Justices, the relentless dissection
of precedents, and the elaborate statutory histories and exegeses, neither
illuminates the Justices' actual thought processes nor instructs the lower-court
judges or the practicing bar in analytical techniques that will resolve difficult legal
HeinOnline -- 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 11 1998
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issues. The Court's caseload is dominated by constitutional cases, and, at the risk
of seeming cynical, I cannot believe that the results in many of these cases owe
much to a genuinely disinterested, a technical or professional, application of
rigorous, "observer independent" methods of inquiry.10 To exaggerate, but not I
think crucially, what has happened as the result of the measures I have described
that have made the Supreme Court a more professional institution has been to
thicken the window dressing."'
The root of the problem is that law is still striving to build a body of real
knowledge of the kind that has enabled the other professions that I have discussed
to move decisively in the direction of genuine professionalism. Perhaps the
strategic or political dimensions of the law make the quest for a solid grounding in
theory illusory. The political dimension is largely responsible for the inroads that
affirmative action and political correctness generally have made in legal education,
with retrogressive results from the standpoint of professionalization-indeed, one
prominent component of the political-correctness beachhead in the law schools is a
scholarly movement critical race theory, that expressly rejects the basic tenets of
12
rational analysis.
V. THE SUPERSESSION THESIS
If there is hope for the law to become a genuine profession in the sense in
the
developments in other occupations are teaching us to understand
which
professionalism, it lies in what I like to call, with deliberate provocation,
"overcoming law" or, alternatively and more neutrally, the "supersession thesis."
It envisages what we understand the law to be today as a transitional phase. The
best articulation of this thesis is found in Holmes' most famous article, The Path of
the Law,13 and in discussing it here I shall be borrowing from a short piece I wrote
recently in commemoration of the centenary of that article. 14 I am sure that many
of you are familiar with Holmes' article or at least with some of its famous
aphorisms, such as, "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law"; "It is revolting to have no better
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry VI";
"For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of the

10.

No doubt each Justice thinks that his or her votes owe everything to such

methods of inquiry, while being skeptical about the votes of the other Justices, just as I
think that my votes as a judge owe everything, or at least a great deal, to those methods.
That is the psychology of judging. It is easy (even for a judge) to be a cynical observer of
judges, but it is difficult to be a cynical judge.
Cf.Deborah Hellman, The Importance ofAppearingPrincipled,37 ARIZ. L.
11.
REv. 1107 (1995).
12.
See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE
RADIcAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997).
13.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897).
14.
Richard A. Posner, The Path awayfrom the Law, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1039

(1997).
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present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of
economics." But my interest is not in these. I want to argue that from the
perspective shaped by the developments I have been discussing, Holmes' article
can be seen to have mounted an even more radical challenge to accepted thinking
about law than he, or at least his audience, could have realized. 15 For the article
implies that law as Holmes knew it, and as we largely know it still, is merely a
stage in human history. It followed revenge historically, and it will be succeeded at
some time in the future by forms of social control that perform the essential
functions of law but are not law in a recognizable sense, although they are latent in
law, just as law was latent in revenge.
Law in the recognizable sense, -the sense that will eventually be
superseded, is assumed to be continuous with morality, enforcing a subset of
moral duties that is determined by considerations of feasibility and by the cost and
efficacy of alternative methods for securing compliance with those duties. (So it
enforces some but not all promises, and punishes deliberate and careless injuries
but not,for example, failures to be a good Samaritan and rescue people in danger.)
Law also enforces a number of morally indifferent, and no doubt some immoral,
duties as well. Still, law is saturated with moral terms. And the morality from
which those terms is drawn is Judeo-Christian and so gives primacy to intentions
and other mental states bearing on culpability, rather than focusing, as the ancient
Greeks did, primarily on results. Law is also traditional-today we would say
"path dependent." The judges have a duty to enforce the political settlements made
in the past. A related point is that law is "logical," meaning that new doctrines can
be created only by derivation, whether by deduction, analogy, or interpretation,
from existing doctrines.

15.
One mustn't be fooled by Holmes' old-fashioned appearance and 'Boston
Brahmin" heritage. He was a futurist, an evolutionist, an iconoclast, and an optimist.
I think it not improbable that man, like the grub that prepares a chamber
for the winged thing it never has seen but is to be-that man may have
cosmic destinies that he does not understand.
...I was walking homeward on Pennsylvania Avenue near the
Treasury, and as I looked beyond Sherman's Statue to the west the sky
was aflame with scarlet and crimson from the setting sun. But, like the
note of downfall in Wagner's opera, below the sky line there came from
little globes the pallid discord of the electric lights. And I thought to
myself the GMtterdganmerung will end, and from those globes clustered
like evil eggs will come the new masters of the sky. It is like the time in
which we live. But then I remembered the faith that I partly have
expressed, faith in a universe not measured by our fears, a universe that
has thought and more than thought inside of it, and as I gazed, after the
sunset and above the electric lights there shone the stars.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., Law and the Court, in THE EssENTIAL HoLMEs: SELECTIONS
FROM THE LETTERs, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 145, 148 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
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This conventional, "official" conception of law, which is as orthodox
today as it was a century ago, Holmes seems to have regarded as epiphenomenal,
dispensable, obscurantist, and transitory. This is the argument of The Path of the
Law as I see it: People care about what the law is because judges have been
empowered to decree the use of overwhelming force, and a prudent person wants
to know how to avoid getting in the way of that force. From this standpoint all that
matters is being able to predict how the judges will rule given a particular set of
facts, and this is why people consult lawyers. Statutes and judicial opinions
provide the materials for the prediction. The predictions of what the courts will do
is really all there is to law. Morality is neither here nor there. A bad man cares as
much about keeping out of the way of state force as a good man; and because law
and morality are frequently discrepant, the law's use of moral language is a source
merely of confusion and it would be good to banish all such language from the
law. For example, while both law and morals use the word "duty" a lot, the legal
duty to keep a promise is merely a prediction that if you don't keep it you'll have
to pay any damages that your promise-breaking imposes on the promisee. The law
doesn't really care about intentions or other mental states, for it enforces contracts
if the parties signify assent, whether or not they do assent. And words like "intent"
or "negligence" as used in the criminal law denote degrees of dangerousness,
nothing more. The moral and mentalistic baggage of the law is connected with the
fact that the basis of most legal principles is tradition. This is to be regretted. The
only worthwhile use of history in law is to debunk outmoded doctrines by showing
them to be literally vestigial. Judges should understand that the only sound basis
for a legal rule is its social advantage, which requires an economic judgment
balancing benefits against costs. If the law submitted to instruction by economics
and the other social sciences, we might find the tort system replaced by a system
of social insurance, and the system of criminal law, which is based on a belief in
deterrence, replaced by a system in which the methods of scientific criminology
are used to identify and isolate, or even kill, dangerous people.
In Holmes' view, as articulated or implied in The Path of the Law, what
judges do is not law in any sense that the contemporary legal professional will
recognize. It is sometimes mindless "standpatism" and sometimes voting their
fears, but sometimes, and ideally, it is weighing costs and benefits, though
doubtless with some regard (much emphasized in Holmes' judicial opinions) for
the desirability of avoiding rapid changes of front that would make it difficult for
lawyers to predict the outcomes of new cases.
Was Holmes correct that "the law" is just a mask or skin that may
confuse the wearer but that has no social function in modernity and that ought to
be stripped away, revealing a policy-making apparatus that could be improved if
only it were recognized for what it was? He was at least half right. There is indeed
a lot of needlessly solemn and obfuscatory moralistic and traditionary blather in
judicial decision making and legal thought generally, and it is immensely useful in
dealing with legal issues always to try to strip away the conventional verbiage in
which the issues come wrapped and look concretely at the interests at stake, the
purposes of the participants, the policies behind the precedents, and the
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consequences of alternative decisions. In other words, the law could use a dose of
the disenchantment that accompanies real professionalization under the conditions
of modernity.
But Holmes overlooked two points. The first is that the more law
conforms to prevailing moral opinions, including the moral opinions of relevant
subcultures such as the commercial community, the easier it is for lay people to
understand and comply with law. The people subject to the law can avoid coming
into conflict with it just by acting the part of well-socialized members of their
community. The second point, which Holmes could not have understood because
it is a lesson of totalitarianism, which did not yet exist in 1897, is that the
maintenance of a moral veneer in the law's dealing with the people subject to it,
especially the antisocial people subject to it, offers a first line of defense against
excesses of official violence. It is not healthy to treat even disgusting criminals as
animals, an idea Holmes toyed with in the The Path of the Law when he said, "If
the typical criminal is a degenerate, bound to swindle or to murder by as deep
seated an organic necessity as that which makes the rattlesnake bite, it is idle to
talk of deterring him by the classical method of imprisonment. He must be got rid
of."16 Excluding a class of human beings from the human community can become
a habit and spread from criminals to ne'er-do-wells to the sick and the aged and
the mentally disturbed or deficient ("Three generations of imbeciles are
enough" 17). By this route, civilization can unravel.
If this is right, the entanglement of law with ethics, and politics, and
rhetoric may indeed be permanent, and the path to complete professionalization
therefore permanently obstructed. But I think, with Holmes, that we can go a long
way down that path before reaching the obstruction. It would be presumptuous of
me to try to trace that path within the compass of this lecture. Suffice it to say that
progress along it will require bringing the social sciences into a closer alignment
with law, welcoming the contribution that artificial intelligence has to make to
law, dispelling the "math block" that continues to inflict so many law students,
lawyers, and judges, and, in all likelihood, moving toward a specialized judiciary,
as well as dismantling the remaining regulatory obstacles to a fully rationalized,
fully competitive legal system. If we move along this path, even if we cannot and
should not attempt to reach its final end, which would be the transformation of law
into a goal-oriented policy science consecrated to the perfection of instrumental
reasoning, we shall be joining a great and, on the whole, a beneficent national
movement toward the professionalization of the professions-and of almost
everything else.

16.
17.

Holmes, supra note 13, at 470.
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (Holmes, J.).
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